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SECURITIES REGULATION OF CONDOMINUM
OFFERINGS
With the deluge of condominium housing development in the United
States since 19601 there has been a corresponding growth of concern for the
possibilities for fraud and other abuses in the offering of condominium units
for sale. Accordingly, a number of commentators have speculated on the
conceivable application of the Federal Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 and
state "Blue Sky Laws" to the sale of condominium units.2  This note is de-
signed to explain the theory behind such possible regulation, action taken
to date, and the limitations, both actual and inherent, of securities regu-
lation of condominium offerings.
Because the Securities Division of -the Illinois Secretary of State's office
follows the definitional and regulatory lead of the Securities and Exchange
Commission,3 the following discussion will, except where inappropriate, treat
both agencies as one, acting under the same theory and method of regula-
tion. In order to understand the possibilities of including cooperative and
condominium housing within the aegis of securities regulation, an attempt
first must 'be made to describe the legal nature of a condominium develop-
ment and its practical uses.
DEFINING THE CONDOMINIUM
Its Legal Nature
Ownership of a condominium unit involves two combined interests in
real property.4  The unit purchaser owns his "apartment," usually defined
by the inside surfaces of the floor, ceiling and four walls, in fee simple.
1. In 1960 condominiums were first "recognized" by an amendment to the Fed-
eral Housing Act authorizing FHA loans for their purchase. By early 1974 Mr. Carl
Sheleen, Vice-President of Talman Federal Savings and Loan in Chicago, Illinois was
able to state in a speech before the Chicago Mortgage Attorneys' Association on Febru-
ary 14, 1974 that an estimate had been made to the effect that in 1973 56% of the on-
line market zoning applications in DuPage County, Illinois were for condominiums, as
opposed to 13% for single family dwellings.
2. See, e.g., B.L. Hoisington, Condominiums and the Corporate Securities Law,
14 HASTINGS LAW J. 241 (1963) [hereinafter referred to as Hoisington] and David G.
Ellsworth, Condominiums Are Securities?, 2 REAL ESTATE LAW J. 694 (1973).
3. Interview with David Wunder, Commissioner of the Securities Division of the
Illinois Secretary of State's Office, in Chicago, Illinois, February 28, 1974.
4. A cooperative is significantly different from a condominium in that unit own-
ers of the former do not hold legal title to their unit. Rather, a corporation or trust is
formed and unit purchasers receive shares of stock or certificates of beneficial interest
evidencing their voting rights in the corporation or trust. The corporation or trust then
holds legal title to the whole property and each unit purchaser is issued a proprietary
lease.
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Concurrently, he owns the "common elements" of the condominium as a ten-
ant in common with all other unit owners. 5 The common elements are
essentially all property in the development not owned in fee simple and are
both specifically and generally defined in the condominium declaration.
The declaration is made of record and acts as a restriction on the unit
owner's possible use of the property. The common elements are then man-
aged by a board of managers elected 'by an association of all unit owners.
A management firm is often retained to oversee the day to day operations
of the development. The voting interests of each unit owner are determined
by a prearranged plan embodied in the declaration and are usually based
on the percentage of ownership of the common elements. Assessments
made by the association for maintenance of the common elements are made
according to proportionate voting interests.
Subject to the restrictions contained in his deed, the declaration and
bylaws of the condominium association, each unit owner has sole control
over and responsibility for his unit. The board of managers controls the
common elements and determines the policy for and restrictions on their use.
The managers act as rental agents or lessors of any income producing com-
mon elements. They may, with the consent of the association as a whole,
develop that property for further income production. The income or divi-
dends are usually kept in the association treasury for the purpose of financ-
ing the maintenance of the common elements; thereby, reducing the main-
tenance assessments against each unit owner. While standard concepts re-
garding the legal nature of condominium development have been estab-
lished, modern usage has created a variety of different condominium forms.
Modern Uses of the Condominium Concept
It is to the credit of -the drafters of the Illinois Condominium Property
Act 6 that the concept of condominium has remained flexible and is not re-
stricted to single structure developments. It is also to the credit of develop-
ers and their attorneys that ingenuity knows no bounds in the use of the
condominium regime. Variations on the basic condominium theme, how-
ever, are predominately responsible for the possibility of extending securities
regulation to various forms of cooperative housing development.
Developers are faced with the immediate problem of marketability of
5. For an in-depth explanation of all facets of condominium law and organiza-
tion, see P. RoIAN and M. RESKIN, CONDOMNIuM LAw AND PRAcncE (1974 ed.).
For specific reference to Illinois Law, see R. BABiARZ and T. APPLETON, Illinois Act
Construed, in the Illinois Institute for Continuing Legal Education HANDBOOK ON
CONDoMINIUM LAw AND PRACTICE IN ILLINOIS (1974). [hereinafter referred to as Babiarz
and Appleton].
6. Illinois Condominium Property Act, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 30 § 301, et. seq.
(1973).
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the development even in the planning stage.7 To augment a unit's market-
ability, the developer will devise a form of condominium that will increase
the development's attractiveness to a particular community, adding "unique"
features to distinguish it from the myriad, otherwise identical developments
in the community. These "unique" features may, under new SEC regula-
tions and judicial theories, create the indicia of a security within the terms
of both the Illinois s and federal 9 acts. Such modern uses of the condomin-
ium concept are being used extensively in suburban Cook County and Du-
Page County, Illinois. 10 The most prominent of these developments are the
quadrominium," the expandable, or add-on condominium,12 and the rental
pool concept of condominium.' 8  In recent developments, management con-
tracts with a professional building manager have been required by the decla-
ration, forcing the unit owner to accept the arrangement as part of his sales
agreement. 1 4  Many more innovations have surfaced in the past few years
as competition among developers has grown. A frequent ploy is to include
income producing property as a common element.' 5
Sample Condominium Offering
For the purposes of later discussion and to further elucidate condomin-
ium organization, let us construct the following condominium development
and offering for sale. This situation is common to other condominium of-
ferings in (all respects except that few developments incorporate all of the
features mentioned.' 6
7. BERMAN, HOW TO ORGANIZE AND SELL CONDOMINIUMS, Prentice-Hall, New
York (1970).
8. Illinois Security Law of 1953, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121%, § 137.1 et seq.
(1973).
9. Federal Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77a et. seq. (1971).
10. Interview with Robert Goldstine, Attorney at Law, March 12, 1974. Mr.
Goldstine represents several condominium developers and is a partner in the firm of
Goldstine and Siegel.
11. In a quadrominium, the units consist either of four flat buildings or are ar-
ranged in groups of four townhouses. Each unit may consist of the whole building or
group, or may be one of the divisions of that group or building, i.e., flat or townhouse.
12. An expandable or add-on condominium is one in which the developer builds
only a portion of the development at a time, selling units in stages as he completes
them. The initial unit purchaser agrees in his contract of sale to allow his percentage
of unit ownership in the common elements to diminish with the growth of the develop-
ment. The add-on condominium is the easiest and most often used method of assuring
financing for a large development.
13. This is a method whereby the unit purchaser agrees to occupy his unit for only
a certain length of time each year and gives the manager the right to rent his unit to
others. The receipts from such rental are then pooled and divided among all unit own-
ers pro rata.
14. Goldstine interview, supra note 10.
15. Such income producing property may be a cooperative grocery, vending ma-
chines, other commercial property, or parking facilities leased to the public.
16. This has been the author's personal experience both in the study of condo-
minium transactions and in shopping the condominium market.
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A site is selected offering easy access to shopping and transportation.
Preliminary documents such as a survey and declaration are drawn. The
type of development contemplated for the purposes of illustration is an ex-
pandable quadrominium. Stage I will be forty four flat buildings and a goal
of 18 months is set for completion. Each unit owner will own a building
containing four apartments and it is expected that the unit owner will occupy
one apartment and rent the other three. Stage II contemplates the addi-
tion of parking facilities, an enclosed pavilion, tennis courts, a swimming pool,
cabana, snack bar and, as a further convenience, facilities for a small
"4general store." Stage III calls for the construction of forty additional four
flat buildings. Financing is secured on the basis of the above plans. The
mortgagee is to receive a certain percentage of the initial income from the
sale of units until the mortgage note is paid.
Once a model is completed the sales effort begins with an advertising
campaign undertaken to describe the various features of the development.
Prospective purchasers receive copies of the declaration and bylaws.
1"
Estimates of the real property taxes and annual maintenance assessments
are made by the developer, and the stage construction is explained. In ef-
fect, the developer is selling the finished (three stages) development at the
initial offering when there is only one stage to show. At this time condo-
minium living is described. The prospective purchaser is told the associa-
tion must employ a professional manager and that the developer will man-
age the condominium for one year or until the association becomes organ-
ized.' 8 Additionally, the annual return to the unit owner from rental of the
remaining three flats is estimated. An offer is made by the management
firm, possibly a subsidiary of the developer, to act as rental agent for the
unit purchaser's other three flats. Estimates concerning the amount of in-
come to be realized from income producing common elements and the per-
centage of annual maintainance charges that will be offset by them are
made. A mortgage is usually secured for the unit purchaser from the mort-
gagee holding the blanket mortgage on the development.
The developer, having sold a number of units, returns to his mortgagee
and secures another mortgage for the construction of Stages II and III based
on his performance shown in Stage I. If a different mortgage arrangement
was made for Stage I, it is possible for the developer to pay less than the
required percentage of the various purchase prices and to use the income
generated by Stage I sales to finance Stages II and III directly.
While this shorthand description of a condominium development and
sale is typical in many respects, it is not all inclusive. It will, however, serve
to raise questions of possible securities regulation. Before direct application
17. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 30 § 322 (1973).
18. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 30 § 318.2 (1973).
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of those regulations :are made, it is necessary to discuss the interpretations
of the acts which make the concept of regulation feasible.
APPLICABILITY OF SECURITIES REGULATION
The purpose of securities regulation as set forth by the Federal Securi-
ties Act of 1933 is to "compel full and fair disclosure relative to the issuance
of 'the many types of instraments that in our commercial world fall within
the ordinary concepts of a security.' "19 The terms of the Act have, and
should be, construed liberally so as to effectuate the intent of Congress and
the legislative bodies of the various states.20  The general theory of securi-
ties regulation is that by the Act's registration requirements the possible of-
ferees of a security may be protected by administrative regulations which
obviate against fraud and even fiscal instability. The severe civil and crimi-
nal penalties for failure to register encourage registration and compliance
with SEC and state regulatory guidelines.
It is imperative that 'the attorney involved in condominium development
have a working knowledge of the applicability of these security regulations
to condominiums. The civil provisions of the 1933 Act provide that the
purchaser of an unregistered security may, within a three year statute of
limitations, 21 sue the seller for recision of the sale and succeed based solely
on a prima facie showing of a failure to register.22 The purchaser may not
only recover his reasonable attorney's fees, but interest on the purchase
price.2 3 Both the Illinois and Federal Acts contain criminal provisions as
well, further prompting attorney compliance with their provisions.
24
While the SEC2 5 and the Illinois courts2 6 have been active in the regu-
lation of cooperative apartments for some time, only recently have condo-
miniums come under scrutiny for securities violations. Interpretive Release
No. 5347,27 issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission on January
18, 1973, sought to officially bring the rental pool condominium within the
purview of the registration requirements of the Act.28 This type of condo-
19. S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1945). [hereinafter referred to as
Howey]
20. S.E.C. v. Joiner Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943). [hereinafter referred to as
Joiner]
21. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77m; ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121 , § 137.13(D) (1973).
22. 15 U.S.C.A. § 771; ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121 § 137.13 (1973).
23. Id. But see 15 U.S.C.A. § 771 (attorney's fees are not recoverable under the
Federal Act).
24. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 § 137.14 (1973); 15 U.S.C.A. § 77yyy (1970).
25. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 2357.
26. E.g., Brothers v. McMahon, 351 Ii1. App. 321, 115 N.E.2d 116 (1953) [here-
inafter referred to as Brothers] and Sire Plan Portfolios, Inc. v. Carpentier, 8 fI1. App.
2d 354, 132 N.E.2d 78 (1956). [hereinafter referred to as Sire Plan].
27. 18 FED. REG. 1735 (1973).
28. See, supra, note 13.
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minium, not widely used in the Midwest,29 is a method whereby the unit
purchaser agrees to occupy his unit for only a certain amount of time each
year, giving the manager the right to rent his unit to others. The receipts
from such rentals are then pooled and divided among all unit owners pro
rata. In effect, any condominium offering that is made
in conjunction with any one of the following will be viewed (by
the SEC) as an offering of a security in the form of an investment
contract.
(1) The condominiums, with any rental arrangement or other
similar service, are offered and sold with emphasis on the
economic benefits to the purchaser to be derived from the
managerial efforts of the promoter, or a third party desig-
nated or arranged for by the promoter, from the rental of the
units;
(2) The offering of a participation in a rental pool arrangement;
and,
(3) The offering of a rental or similar arrangement whereby the
purchaser must hold his unit available for rental for any part
of the year, must use an exclusive rental agent or is other-
wise materially restricted in his occupancy or rental of his
unit.3o
Based upon the few no-action letters3 1 issued by the SEC under this regu-
lation, 3 2 it would appear that for the present, securities regulation is limited
to the highly hybrid form of rental pool condominium development.
3
3
Several interpretations of the Act itself have, however, posed possible
problems for condominium specie common in Illinois.34 Using the definition
of the Federal Securities Act of 1933, 35 a security is:
[A]ny note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of
indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit
sharing agreement, collateral trust certificate, preorganization cer-
tificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract,
voting trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, frac-
29. This kind of development has, to date, been predominantly limited to resort
areas such as Florida and the skiing regions of the Rocky Mountains. L. Grimes and
D. King, A Look at Condominium Offerings Under the Federal Securities Law for the
Idaho Lawyer, 9 IDAHo LAw REV. 149 (1973).
30. Supra, note 27, at 1736.
31. A no action letter is issued by the staff of the SEC when it is determined by
them that they would not take any action against a promoter for failure to register his
activity with the SEC. A no action letter must be requested by the promoter or his at-
torney. The SEC, however, announced on May 6, 1974 that it would no longer issue
no action letters in the area of resort real estate. 1 BNA SEC. REG. L. RPmR. 252C-1
(May 15, 1974).
32. CCH FED. SEc. L. REP., 79,4401 and 79,612 (1973).
33. Wunder interview, supra note 3.
34. See, supra, notes 11-14.
35. The Illinois Security Act of 1953 contains no material deviations from the
Federal Act's definitions. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1211/2, § 137.2-1 (1973).
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tional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in
general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a security,
or any certificate of interest in or participation in, temporary or
interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right
to subscribe to or purchase any of the foregoing. 36
Obviously, the most available definition 'applicable to condominiums is the
"investment contract." The initial battle having been won by those seek-
ing to regulate condominiums under the securities laws by -the adoption of
Release No. 5347, the investment contract is the battering ram that may
be used to break down the sacrosanct nature of -the real estate transaction
3 7
heretofore used to proftect condominiums from securities regulation. 8
The Investment Contract
The preeminent case defining the investment contract for the purposes
of securities regulation is Securities and Exchange Commission v. W.J.
Howey Co.39 The Howey Court was faced with the sale of small sections
of an orange grove, too small for single purchaser cultivation. This offer
was coupled with the seller's offer of a service contract permitting a sub-
sidiary of the Howey Company to manage the property and pay the net
profits to the purchaser. While agreement to the service contract was not
mandatory, the two contracts were advertised in such a way that 85 percent
of the acreage sold was covered by Howey's service contract. The Court's
definition of an investment contract brought the above transaction well with-
in securities regulation.
[A]n investment contract for the purposes of the Securities Act
means a contract, transaction or scheme -whereby a person invests
his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits sole-
ly from the efforts of the promoter or third party, it being im-
material whether the shares in the enterprise are evidenced by
formal certificates or by nominal interests in the physical assets
employed in the enterprise.
40
The purchasers here brought not only an interest in land but also, through
the service contract, an interest in "a citrus fruit enterprise managed and
partly owned by [Howey].''41  While Howey abolished the necessity to
prove a security by the issuance of "-formal certificates," a prospective plain-
tiff must still meet the well defined test set forth above.
Each condominium is by definition a common enterprise. Even though
each unit owner is autonomous with regard to his unit, he has either directly
36. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77b.
37. Brothers, supra note 26.
38. See, R. Rifkind and M. Burton, SEC Registration of Real Estate Interests.
An Overview, THE BUSINESS LAwYER 649, 659 (April, 1972).
39. Howey, supra note 19.
40. Id. at 289-90.
41. Id. at 299.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
or indirectly financed the construction and maintenance of common elements
-through the purchase price and maintenance assessments. Condominium
ownership is a bifurcated state of legal title and the various unit owners must
act in concert not only to fulfill the theory of cooperative living but also
to effect the management of the common elements. Of course, if the appli-
cability of securities regulation is to be determined, the common enterprise
must ,be involved in an activity that would raise the indicia of a security.
The two most troublesome features of the Howey test are the finding
of profit which must, as well, be derived solely from the efforts of a pro-
moter or third person.42 Applied to non4ental pool condominium transac-
tions, the finding of an ascertainable pecuniary profit per se is usually im-
possible. But later cases have significantly altered the strict test thus ex-
panding the possibility of regulation.
In Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski43 the California court was
faced with a development scheme where memberships in a yet to be built
country club were sold. These memberships amounted only to a future right
to use the facilities of the club upon completion. The court held the trans-
action a sale of a security and the purchasers were granted a recision of
their contracts. The profit found in this transaction was the benefit to be
given the purchasers in the form of membership in the club. This "profit"
was neither a pecuniary return on the investment or a purchase of an ex-
clusive right to the use of the club. The scheme essentially amounted to
a common enterprise to build a country club which was guaranteed to supply
certain facilities to the investors. In determining profit, then, the modem
interpretation of Howey allows a court to find any benefit derived from the
purchase or investment a "profit" for the purposes of determining a secur-
ity. 44 However to meet the M force of the Howey test this profit must
be derived "solely" from the efforts of the promoter or a third person.
In most condominiums, the association or its board of managers ulti-
mately controls the common elements so that it could not be said that the
profit or benefit is gleaned solely from the efforts of the promoter or third
party. 45  More recent interpretations of Howey have diluted this require-
ment significantly.
42. See, e.g., McCormick v. Shively, 267 Ill. App. 91 (1932).
43. 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961).
44. Ronald J. Coffey, The Economic Realities of a Security; Is There a More
Meaningful Formula?, 18 WESTERN RESERVE LAw REv. 367 (1967). [hereinafter re-
ferred to as Coffey] "In such non-profit corporations where the shareholder does not
expect monetary return, he nevertheless maintains an interest in an enterprise which he
expects to see operated in a fashion that will result in some sort of continuing benefit
to him." Hoisington, supra note 2.
45. Babiarz and Appleton, supra note 5. This note will not consider the securities
implications of the recent tendency of condominium associations to incorporate them-
selves with not-for-profit status.
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In S.E.C. v. Genn W. Turner Enterprise, Inc.,46 the Ninth Circuit held
the purchase of self-improvement courses to be a pyramid fraud scheme
47
and a security within the provisions of the Act, thereby redefining an invest-
ment contract in the process. Here, the purchasers of the self-improvement
programs were given kits containing books and taped lectures. Various
types of kits and courses were offered. For the purchase of the "delux"
plan, the buyer was given a chance to recoup his investment and expand
his income by selling the course to others. The defendant encouraged sales
by such persons with "pep talks" and other motivational techniques. After
his first two "sales" the buyer-turned-seller received four hundred dollars per
customer. The defendant argued that because purchasers of the "delux"
plan themselves created any profit they were led to expect, by their own
sales efforts, the transaction did not meet the Howey "sole effort" test and
was, therefore, not a security. The court rejected this contention, saying:
Regardless of the fact that the purchaser here must contribute some-
thing besides his money, the essential managerial efforts which
affect the failure or success of the enterprise are those of Dare
[a subsidiary of the defendant], not his own.
48
This deviation from the strict interpretation of Howey is given certain cre-
dence since the SEC has cited Turner approvingly on this point in Release
No. 5347.49
Thus in recent cases, the definition of an investment contract has been
expanded for the purposes of securities regulation. The three primary req-
uisites of the transaction are: (1) a common enterprise; (2) from this com-
mon enterprise profits or other benefits are expected to accrue to the pur-
chaser, investor or adventurer; and, (3) these profits or benefits are derived
to a significant extent from the activities of the promoter or other persons.
This formula, while much more flexible in its terms, still requires the proof
of three separate elements rather than to allow investigation of the more
important question of whether the basic nature of the transaction is within
the avowed purpose of securities regulation.
An outgrowth of Turner is the "risk capital test." A few courts50 and
legal writers"' have determined the existence of a security in this way: if
one solicits money for his use, promising a return on or a benefit from the
investment made, and there is a risk involved in the use of that capital, i.e.,
46. S.E.C. v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973).
[hereinafter referred to as Turner].
47. A pyramid fraud scheme is very much like a chain letter where purchasers of
the fraudulent offering are promised they can make even more money by a continued
participation in the scheme.
48. Turner, supra note 46.
49. 18 FED. REo. 1735 n. 2 (1973).
50. Turner, supra note 46.
51. Coffey, supra note 44.
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the investor will lose his investment or will not receive a benefit from it, the
transaction is an investment contract and a security. The test is based on
the degree of risk over which the investor has no control and arises from
the established concept that a security must be found by looking at the sub-
stance of the transaction rather than at -the form. As one of these writers
has said:
The well worn principle of 'looking through form to substance' is
really another way of saying that the definitive characteristics of
an activity are found in the 'risks' and 'relationships' involved and
not in the 'names' or 'labels' associated with it.
52
This new look in securities regulation is really based on the pre-Howey case
of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Joiner Corp.58 where the Court
said:
It is clear that an economic interest in this (enterprise) . . . was
what brought into being the instruments (evidencing real property
interests) that defendants were selling and gave the instruments
most of their value and all of their lure. The trading in these
(interests) . . . had all the evils inherent in the securities transac-
tions which it was the aim of the Securities Act to end. (emphasis
added by Coffey) 
5 4
It is possible by this method to find a security in the sale of condominium
units when the substance of the transaction embodies a risk that the develop-
ment will not succeed, or that the development will not meet the goals ad-
vertised by the promoter and that -risk is in the control of the promoter or
someone other than the investor.
5 5
52. Hoisington, supra note 2, at 244.
53. Joiner, supra note 20.
54. Id. at 349, as quoted in Coffey, supra note 44, at 381.
55. See 47 ALR3d 1375. Professor Coffey has designed his own risk capital test:
"A security is:
(1) a transaction in which
(2) a person (buyer) furnishes value (initial value) to another (seller);
and
(3) a portion of the initial value is subjected to the risks of an enter-
prise, it being sufficient if
(a) part of the initial value is furnished for a proprietary interest
in, or debt holder claim against, the enterprise, or
(b) any property received by the buyer is committed to use by the
enterprise, even though the buyer retains specific ownership of
such property, or
(c) part of the initial value is furnished for property whose present
value is determined by taking into account the anticipated but
unrealized success of the enterprise, even though the buyer has
no legal relationship with the enterprise; and
(4) at the time of the transaction the buyer is not familiar with the op-
erations of the enterprise or does not receive the right to participate
in the management of the enterprise; and
(5) the furnishing of initial value is induced by the seller's promises or
representations which give rise to a reasonable understanding that
a valuable benefit of some kind, over and above initial value, will
accrue to the buyer as a result of the operation of the enterprise."
Coffey, supra note 44, at 377.
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Specific Application of Securities Theories to the
Condominium Model
Several aspects of the sample condominium development described
above raise very serious securities problems. As was discussed previously,
in many instances a condominium is by nature a common enterprise for the
purposes of securities regulation. The purchaser of a unit must, however,
be !.ed, by the sales effort of the promoter, to expect certain things from his
purchase beyond the ownership of his unit as a home.
Many elements of the sample development indicate the presence of an
expected profit or benefit. It is assumed that such expectation need not
be the primary consideration in the determination of the buyer to purchase
a unit. The quadrominium form is an obvious inducement to the purchaser
because he is told the approxiamte rental value of the available three apart-
ments and he is made to see -the low cost of his own apartment since the
interest and principal on his mortgage may be paid from his rental income.
Of course in this instance, the quadrominium is very close to being within
the terms of Release No. 5347. Likewise, an income producing common
element such as storefront commercial property or parking facilities with ex-
,tra spaces rented to the public may be present. The developer, in selling
the units, will opine the amount of income to be made from the rental of
such property, using it to offset a certain percentage of the estimated yearly
maintenance assessments. 56
Because a condominium is organized to place control of these benefits
within function of the condominium assocation and its board of managers,
another step must be taken to find a security. In search of "sole" or "pri-
mary" efforts, note must be taken of Section 318.2 of the Illinois Condomin-
ium Property Act. That section allows the developer to maintain control
over the affairs of the development for one year after the recording of the
declaration or until a certain percentage of the unit owners form the associa-
tion and elect -a board of managers. If sales efforts are non-productive, it
is conceivable that the developer could keep control of the association for
a longer period of time by virtue of his ownership of unsold units. Such
control may result in a significant change in the philosophy of the enterprise.
The developer may increase the assessments and add unwanted luxury fea-
tures to further promote sales. He may control income producing common
elements and commit the association to long term leases which may retard
the capital appreciation of the units which may not meet with the approval
of the existing unit owners for a variety of reasons.
56. Edward T. Joyce v. Ritchie Tower Properties, Civil No. 74 C 116 (D. Ill.,
filed January 14, 1974) [hereinafter referred to as Joyce]. The allegation that prom-
ises were made as to rental income are contained in paragraphs six and seven of the
complaint.
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More important is the recent tendency to require, in the declaration,
the employment of a firm of professional managers to operate the develop-
ment. Depending on the degree of real control given over to the manager,.
it could become evident that any of the benefits the purchaser was led to
expect are created solely, or at least primarily, by the efforts and judgment
of the third person manager. This is especially true in the quadrominium
where the manager's rental agency is sold to prospective unit purchasers.
While agreement with the manager for a rental agency may not be manda-
tory, it must be remembered that in Howey the service contract was not
mandatory either. Because of the manner of offering the land for sale, how-
ever, a security was found. One must also question the degree of actual
control the board of managers would have over the professional manager.
An Illinois Appellate Court has found a similar arrangement for professional
management services with control vested in trustees of a cooperative "illu-
sory, not real control." 57  Of course, the transaction must be evaluated as
a whole and one factor to be weighed is the manner in which units were
offered for sale.
It is often customary to advertise a condominium offering with an em-
phasis on the investment character of the purchase of a unit.5 8 Many times
appreciation figures for similar developments are given.59 By such induce-
ments, it is possible to view the condominium offering not to be so much
concerned with the sale of a dwelling as with a commodity. There is a fine
line between "puffing" and creating real security problems in this regard,
especially under the risk capital -test. Of course, advertising the value of
the condominium alone will not create the indicia of a security, but if the
purchaser is led by such advertising to expect benefits in addition to a place
to live by the purchase of 'a unit, an examination of the offering may be
weighted in favor of the finding of a security.
Further problems under the risk capital test could be raised by the
method of financing. Supposing that Stage I was sold partially with refer-
ence to future stages, it is obvious that the unit purchasers in Stage I will
be placing risk capital in the hands of the developer ,for construction of
future accoutrements to their property. Even -though the mortgagee is paid
from the first income of the sales, any surplus will be used in the further
development of the site. The promoter will not recover his profit until the
project is completed. Therefore, the initial purchaser is obliquely financing
his own swimming pool or other future construction. Even though he takes
immediate possession of his unit, the initial purchaser has bargained for
57. Sire Plan, supra note 26. The court held that where purchasers of coopera-
tive apartments were forced to sign a long term management agreement with the devel-
oper, the fact that 60% of the units of ownership could combine to oust the trustees was
"illusory, not real control.", at 359.
58. Joyce, supra note 56.
59. Id. See specifically paragraphs five and six of the complaint.
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more than the unit alone. He has bought into a larger, but unfinished, de-
velopment and has risked his investment on the hope that all stages will
be completed.
AMELIORATING FACTORS
While, as seen above, it is possible to find any number of condomin-
ium offerings to be a security, it is significant that there has been no rush
to do so on the part of regulatory agencies and the courts. Action taken
to date seems to have been limited to rental pool condominium agreements
within the terms of Release No. 5347. 6o However, there are three suits for
recision of condominium purchase agreements based upon a failure to
register the condominium offering as a security in litigation at the time of
this writing.61  The plaintiff in each instance is apparantly proceeding on
the theories outlined above. The condominiums in question were advertised
as an investment and have as a common element income producing property
which -the promoter opined would offset fifteen percent of the total main-
tenance costs each year.6 2  Management contracts were signed so that the
purchasers had no real control over the operations of that rental property.
While a firm opinion as to the success of the plaintiff's contentions in
the above cited suits is impossible, it should be noted that several courts
have refused to carry securities regulation even as far as cooperative housing
developments.6 3  Applying the rule that the substance of a transaction
governs its form64 in determining the presence of a security, it would be,
and has been, comparatively easy for a court to decide that what is really
being sold is real estate-or more significantly, a home. Even though sev-
eral elements of the Howey test are present, it is possible a court will say
it is not within the purpose of the Securities Act to extend regulation that
far. In Illnois, this is the position of the Commissioner of the Securities
60. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP., 79,4401 (1973). A recent case has, however,
found a New York cooperative to be within the aegis of securities regulation. Forman
v. Community Services Inc. (2d Cir. June 12, 1974) (reported in REAL ESTATE L. REP.
July 1974, at 1). The court in that case said, "'To look to the substance of the term
'stock' is in essence to determine if an 'investment contract' of some sort exists,' and
that in turn fundamentally depends on whether there's an expectation of profits from
the efforts of the promoter or others." Id. In finding an expectation of profit to the
cooperative stock purchasers, the court relied on three items: 1) the existence of tax
benefits to the shareholders; 2) "rent" savings, i.e., it is less expensive in the long run
to own a cooperative apartment than to rent a comparable dwelling; and, 3) a share
in commercial leasing of common elements of the cooperative with rental income going
toward the reduction of carrying charges.
61. Joyce, supra note 56; R. Alden Jones v. 247 East Chestnut Properties, Civil
No. 74 C 293 (D. Ill., filed January 30, 1974); Edward T. Joyce v. Ritchie Tower Prop-
erties, Inc., Civil No. 73 Ch 05304 (Cook Co. Circuit Court, filed September 14, 1973).
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., Brothers, supra note 26.
64. Howey, supra note 19.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Division of -the Illinois Secretary of State's Office6" and it finds some support
in the Illinois courts. 66
Securities regulation proceeds on a case by case basis and the "true
nature" of the transaction must be ascertained in each instance. 67 This is
how the Illinois Appellate Court distinguished Brothers v. McMahon68 and
Sire Plan Portfolios, Inc. v. Carpentier.69 In Brothers, the plaintiff paid the
purchase price for a cooperative apartment which the developers failed to
complete. The court held the sale of shares of a cooperative to be the sale
of a type of housing and not a security. In making this determination the
court looked to the substance of the transaction; what was being sold and
how it was sold. In Sire Plan, however, the court held deeds of trust evi-
dencing an interest in a cooperative apartment house in New York City to
be a security. The essential difference between the two developments was
the amount of control vested in the purchaser. In Sire Plan each purchaser
agreed as a part of the contract of sale to allow the developer to manage
the building on a long term basis. There was also a difference in the type
of housing in question. In Sire Plan the units were offered primarily as
second homes or investments while in Brothers the plaintiffs purchased their
shares as a primary place of abode. This confusion, both in the courts and
at the bar, as to the practical application of securities concepts to condomin-
ium offerings is perhaps rooted in a basic distaste for the securities method
of regulating real estate practices. Accordingly, other methods of regula-
tion 'have been suggested.
ALTERNATIVES TO SECURITIES REGULATION OF CONDOMINIUM
OFFERINGS
It must be asked how many abuses of good faith or full disclosure there
really are each year in condominium transactions. The author has no
method to ascertain such figures but would suggest that they are few in num-
ber because of the participation of mortgagees and title insurance com-
panies in the planning stages of condominium development.
Conversely, the problem for the developer created by holding the con-
dominium offering to be a security is enormous. One condominium regis-
tration alone has cost as much -as $125,000.70 In addition, once a security
has been found, it may be sold only by licensed securities brokers registered
65. Wunder interview, supra note 3.
66. E.g., Brothers, supra note 26 and Foreman v. Holsman, Civil No. 34021 (No-
vember 26, 1956) (unpublished opinion reversing Foreman v. Holsman, 9 Ill. App. 2d
317, 132 N.E.2d 688 (1956).).
67. Interview with Gus Pappas, Securities Division of the Illinois Secretary of
State's Office, Chicago, Illinois, February 20, 1974.
68. Brothers, supra note 26.
69. Sire Plan, supra note 26.
70. Ellsworth, supra note 2.
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under the 1934 Act. 7 ' It is conceivable as well that in each development
there will 'be a possibility that an exemption from the Act may be had.
72
However in order to qualify for an exemption, or even to comply with regu-
lation, the developer may be forced to restrict his sales practice and advertis-
ing significantly.7 3
Other methods exist for supervising the condominiums being offered for
sale and regulating any abuses that may be found. In New York, all con-
dominium documents must be approved by the Attorney General's office.
7 4
By this method and other powers given -the Attorney General under the stat-
ute, such as the power of subpeona and injunction, the state may require
compliance with certain regulations and the submission of financing state-
ments to insure fiscal responsibility. Thus, the state is able to protect pros-
pective purchasers of condominium units without unduly restricting the free-
dom of, or financially burdening, the condominium developer.
At this writing, a law similar to New York's is under consideration in
the General Assembly of Illinois. 75 The bill amends the Illinois Condomin-
ium Property Act by changing the recording provisions contained in the pres-
ent statute. Instead of recording -the declaration of condominium with the
County Clerk or Recorder, the developer would file the same documents
-with the Illinois Secretary of State. The Secretary is then given the power
to determine what documents must be filed in support of the declaration,
including balance sheets of the developer and other financial information.
He may also reject the filing "if there are conditions affecting the sale which
would be inequitable, or would work or tend to work a fraud or deceit."1
7 6
The Secretary is given the power of investigation supported by the power
of subpeona. He may prohibit or suspend the sale of units temporarily, he
may ask the Attorney General to seek an injunction against the sale of units,
'or he may order the proceeds of the sale of units 'be held in escrow until
the developer meets certain conditions.
While such powers may seem overbroad, they are in effect no less so
than the powers given the various agencies charged with securities regula-
71. Federal Securities Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77b, et. seq.
72. A number of exemptions are available under both state and federal law. These
include the private offering exemption, the intra-state offering exemption, and exemp-
tions for transactions whose cummulative value is under a certain amount. See, Gimes
and King, supra note 29.
73. E.g., a developer may limit his customers to less than a certain number per
year to qualify for a private offering exemption or only to residents of the state of situs
to qualify for the federal intra-state exemption.
74. N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 339-ee (McKinney 1974) specifically includes
condominiums within the regulatory provisions of N.Y. GENERAL Bus. LAw § 3 52-e
(McKinney 1974).
75. H.B. 2027 (ammending sections 303 and 304 of the Illinois condominium
Property Act) (introduced October 15, 1973).
76. Id. § 4(B).
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tion. It is to be remembered that the same effect would be had, i.e., regula-
tion of condominium offerings so as to prevent fraud or faulty disclosure,
without the deleterious effects of securities regulation discussed above.
CONCLUSION
This note has attempted to provide the reader with a theoretical outline
of a way in which securities regulation may be extended -to non-rental pool
condominium offerings. The investment contract test of Howey, as modi-
fied, may in some instances be made to -apply to condominium develop-
ments. The more modern risk capital test has been seen to apply to even
more varied situations because of its flexibility. A cautionary note was
sounded as to the immediate -likelihood of extending securities regulation.
It is still judicial policy to look through form to substance, but that maxim
in no way lessens the technical applicability of the Security Acts to this field
of activity.
It is the opinion of the author that such an extension would not only
be unwieldy but also would be an unconscionable burden for the developer
and an unreasonable hazard for the practicing attorney. Legislation in Illi-
nois modeled loosely on the New York regulatory statute would be prefer-
able to such an extension of securities regulation, if such regulation be
needed at all.
THOMAS R. APPLETON
